The train arriving at La Ciotat -- Perception, philosophy, art -- The haunting of the house of reason -- Reading clues -- Lighting the ground -- Chiaroscuro -- The night of the living dead -- The apparition of history -- The telephonics of the text -- Dissolving shots -- Biomorph -- Nocturnal hallucinations -- Flat surfaces -- Shadow writing -- Exposure toward futurity.

This essay examines the scratch as it relates to garbage, scores, and the event. Garbage is that which is cast aside as social systems form themselves, and, as such, is always destined to return. Scores are both methodological maps and experimental artistic methods. And the event, in this context, is the opening that enables both the determination of form and the emergence of the unexpected.

In _Narcissus Transformed_, Gray Kochhar-Lindgren interprets Narcissus as thematizing the tragic situation of the postmodern subject. After showing the connections between Cartesian philosophy and narcissism, he proceeds to lay out the function of Narcissus as a poetic figure of discourse in the fields of psychoanalysis and modern fiction. He moves beyond the description of narcissism to an interpretation of the conditions necessary for Narcissus, the beautiful boy captivated by his own image, to become a different kind of (...) subject. The topos of narcissism, which is first articulated by Ovid, always includes within itself a mirror, a gap, self-referential desire, and death—all of which culminate in Narcissus's inability to make space for an Other. Kochhar-Lindgren contends that this is the founding topos of modern philosophy, which is then incorporated into and transmuted by the disciplines of psychoanalysis and fiction. With the extensive work of Freud on narcissism, it becomes a central concept for psychoanalysis; and with Lacan's interpretation of the narcissist as phantom, statue, and automaton, narcissism moves into a specifically textual interpretation of subjectivity. Kochhar-Lindgren then provides close readings of fictional texts-—_The Waves_ by Virginia Woolf, _The Ogre _by Michel Tournier, and _Daniel Martin_ by John Fowles—to show more explicitly the textual construction of the narcissistic subject and to suggest ways that Narcissus might be transformed into a subject not held in thrall to the "glassy-eyed stare of Thanatos." He concludes with an enactment, from a Lacanian and fictional perspective, of the beginnings of the undoing of the narcissistic topos of contemporary culture. Narcissus steps from the self-reflective mirror into a theater; he stops longing to be a purely self-reflexive work in order to become part of the play of a text. (shrink)

Examines philosophy as an event of the city and the city as an event of philosophy and how the intertwining of the two generates an urban imaginary.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Primal Philosophy: Rousseau with Laplanche by Lucas FainGray Kochhar-LindgrenFain, Lucas. Primal Philosophy: Rousseau with Laplanche. Rowman & Littlefield, 2021. 216pp.In Primal Philosophy: Rousseau with Laplanche, Lucas Fain sets out to explicate the very possibility of philosophy, with its origins in wonder and its end in happiness. He moves toward these goals through a comprehensive reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Socratism” intercalated with Jean Laplanche’s psychoanalytic intervention focused on (...) the universality of untranslatable “enigmatic messages” that shape the (un)conscious of each individual. Through this combination of trajectories, Fain hopes both to deconstruct philosophy’s metaphysical origins along the lines of thinkers from Descartes through Badiou, and also return this fundamental question back to the emergence of the wisdom of eudaimonia, the flourishing of happiness, as a libidinal object.When the teaching, historical periodization, and explication of philosophy takes Rousseau under its wing, it is usually as a political theorist, but, as Fain reminds us, Rousseau explicitly asserts that he is “neither a philosopher nor austere,” but instead a “man of paradox,” a “friend of virtue,” or a “friend of the truth” (qtd. in Fain 5). This is important for it is related to the claims that paradox is an irrevocable trait of thinking, that philosophy requires friends both within and outside its rather blurry boundaries, and that reason cannot, in the end, claim self-grounding knowledge of its own origins and ends. Fain, like Rousseau, writes as a friend of the love of wisdom and “[a]gainst all the odds, the combination of Rousseau with Laplanche amounts to something of a double-dog dare against the ruling conventions of academic philosophy” (ix). The wager has been laid on the table, but it will extend far beyond the contemporary academy.A certain image of Socrates is the central figure around which Fain’s reading of Rousseau is organized. This is Socrates as that oddball Athenian irritant who works to demonstrate, succinctly put, that “virtue is knowledge; happiness is knowledge of the good” (4). This Socrates—and [End Page 92] Socrates is always multiplying—knows the irony of the unknowing and the joy of the virtuously beautiful. Phronēsis will be more foundational than epistēmē and philosophy, in itself—however that “in itself” is construed—will not be sufficient to explain itself. It has a constitutive blind-spot that will need looking into from different perspectives. It will need Rousseau and Laplanche, for instance, as external supports in order to get it into gear, with Laplanche being the psychoanalyst who most systematically brings this “support” of Freud’s Anlehnung—often translated as “anaclitic”—as a relation between the Instinkt of biology and the Trieb of the psyche, into sharper critical relief.Plato, in Theaetetus, succinctly states the origin of philosophy is “wonder” at a point in the conversation focused on questions of becoming and definition, which have already made the Theaetetus “dizzy.” (We all know what that is like.) Socrates replies to this confession, noting that “It looks as though Theodorus’s sketch of your character was accurate my friend. I mean, this feeling—a sense of wonder—is perfectly proper to the philosopher: philosophy has no other foundation, in fact. Whoever said that Iris was the offspring of Thaumas was no mean genealogist” (155d, 37). The genealogist in question is Hesiod, who, in the Theogony (265–6), observed that Iris (the rainbow as a ‘shining wonder’) was the daughter of Thaumas (‘wonder’) and Electra (‘shining’). Let me limit my comments here to simply observing that Theaetetus’s character, not just his ratiocination, matters. The dizziness becomes an opening to the shining wonder “beneath which” there is no other foundation.Socrates, as he so often does, translates the poetic into the philosophical, but without losing sight of the former. The mythopoetic—for both Plato and Rousseau—is inseparable from logic’s explanatory force and cannot be extirpated by that force. This relationship is active throughout Primal Philosophy and binds together the philosophical, the artistic, and the psychoanalytic. Although genre distinctions are generally useful, Freud points out thedream-thoughts which we first come across as we proceed with our analysis often strike us by... (shrink)

‘Smart’ devices are becoming increasingly ubiquitous. While these sophisticated machines are useful for various purposes, they sometimes evoke feelings of eeriness or discomfort that constitute uncanniness, a much-discussed phenomenon in robotics research. Adult participants (N = 115) rated the uncanniness of a hypothetical future smart speaker that was described as possessing the mental capacities for experience, agency, neither, or both. The novel condition prompting participants to attribute both agency and experience to the speaker filled an important theoretical gap in the (...) literature. Consistent with the mind perception hypothesis of uncanniness (MPH; Gray & Wegner, 2012), participants in the with-experience condition rated the device significantly higher in uncanniness than those in the control condition and the with-agency condition. Participants in the with-both (experience and agency) condition also rated the device higher in uncanniness than those in the control condition and the with-agency condition, although this latter difference only approached statistical significance. (shrink)

Background Citizen science is increasingly prevalent in the biomedical sciences, including the field of human genomics. Genomic citizen science initiatives present new opportunities to engage individuals in scientific discovery, but they also are provoking new questions regarding who owns the outputs of the research, including intangible ideas and discoveries and tangible writings, tools, technologies, and products. The legal and ethical claims of participants to research outputs become stronger—and also more likely to conflict with those of institution-based researchers and other stakeholders—as (...) participants become more involved, quantitatively and qualitatively, in the research process. It is not yet known, however, how genomic citizen science initiatives are managing the interests of their participants in accessing and controlling research outputs in practice. To help fill this gap, we conducted an in-depth review of relevant policies and practices of U.S.-based genomic citizen science initiatives. Methods We queried the peer-reviewed literature and grey literature to identify 22 genomic citizen science initiatives that satisfied six inclusion criteria. A data collection form was used to capture initiative features, policies, and practices relevant to participants’ access to and control over research outputs. Results This analysis revealed that the genomic citizen science landscape is diverse and includes many initiatives that do not have institutional affiliations. Two trends that are in apparent tension were identified: commercialization and operationalization of a philosophy of openness. While most initiatives supported participants’ access to research outputs, including datasets and published findings, none supported participants’ control over results via intellectual property, licensing, or commercialization rights. However, several initiatives disclaimed their own rights to profit from outputs. Conclusions There are opportunities for citizen science initiatives to incorporate more features that support participants’ access to and control over research outputs, consistent with their specific objectives, operations, and technical capabilities. (shrink)

Grey’s Anatomy focuses on the personal and professional life of protagonist Meredith Grey. Throughout the long series, a consistent theme is that the audience is confronted with moral dilemmas in Meredith’s professional work with patients as well as in her personal life. Grey’s decision-making often breaks professional protocol in order to do what she believes is best for her patients and those close to her. We argue that Grey’s approach to morality is representative of Simone de Beauvoir’s approach (...) in The Ethics of Ambiguity. In this text, Beauvoir argues that an existentialist ethic must reject a childlike approach to morality in which moral rules are absolute and moral dilemmas have obvious answers. Instead, she argues for a rejection of universalist ethics in favor of acknowledging the ambiguity of the moral realm. By tracing Meredith’s decision-making throughout the course of different seasons of the show, we argue that Meredith exemplifies an existential authenticity compatible with Beauvoir’s existentialist approach to ethics. (shrink)

This challenging interdisciplinary collection of essays sets out to find cultural significance and value in America’s post modern society. The book includes analyses of a wide range of contemporary cultural artifacts—poetry, novels, myths, painting, cinematic images—from different vantage points, but especially from the perspective of those working in the area of religion and culture. While the contributors recognize that there are no simple solutions for identifying satisfactory values in today’s society, they all emphasize the close kinship between ethics and aesthetics (...) in their interpretations. Imagery of many sorts comes up for a closer look: the imagery of the anti-abortion movement, heroic and mythic figures, rituals, politics, gender issues, and race relations. Giving voice to “difference” and “the other,” the essays provide a lively discussion about where our common future is headed and how we can remain responsible to values that are beneficial to the largest number of people. _Contributors: William G. Doty, David H. Fisher, Matthew Fox, Stephen Karatheodoris, Gary Kochhar-Lindgren, Hank Lazer, Mark Ledbetter, Irena S. M. Makarushka, Daniel C. Noel, Jerome Rothenberg, Lynda Sexson_. (shrink)

This book explores the role of aggression in primate social systems and its implications for human behavior.

This intra-view explores a number of productive junctions between contemporary Deleuzoguattarian and new materialist praxes via a series of questions and provocations. Productive tensions are explored via questions of epistemological, ontological, ethical, and political intra-sections as well as notions of difference, transversal contamination, ecosophical practices, diffraction, and, lastly, schizoanalysis. Various irruptions around biophilosophy, transduction, becomology, cartography, power relations, hyperobjects as events, individuation, as well as dyschronia and disorientation, take the discussion further into the wild pedagogical spaces that both praxes have (...) in common. -/- . (shrink)

Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind is often understood as the claim that the mind has a part that is eternal. I appeal to two principles that Spinoza takes to govern parthood and causation to raise a new problem for this reading. Spinoza takes the composition of one thing from many to require causal interaction among the many. Yet he also holds that eternal things cannot causally interact, without mediation, with things in duration. So the human mind, since (...) it is the idea of a body existing in duration, cannot have an eternal part. In order to solve this problem, I propose an aspectual reading of Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind: the mind itself is eternal, under one of its aspects. (shrink)

Although Spinoza disagrees with Descartes's claim that animals are mindless, he holds that we may nevertheless treat them as we please because their natures are different from human nature. Margaret Wilson has questioned the validity of Spinoza's argument, since it is not clear why differences in nature should imply differences in ethical status. In this paper, I propose a new interpretation of Spinoza's argument that responds to Wilson's challenge. We have ethical commitments to other humans only because we share the (...) same nature, for this implies that in helping them become more perfect, we also make them more useful to us. However, since animals have different natures than we do, helping them perfect themselves may make them less useful to us. Reason dictates only what it can dictate unconditionally, so it does not guide us to pursue the good of lower animals. Though Spinoza's argument is valid, there is little reason to think it sound; I conclude with a brief criticism of Spinoza's doctrine of human nature, which plays a central role in the argument. (shrink)

A recent report from the UN makes the case for “global data literacy” in order to realise the opportunities afforded by the “data revolution”. Here and in many other contexts, data literacy is characterised in terms of a combination of numerical, statistical and technical capacities. In this article, we argue for an expansion of the concept to include not just competencies in reading and working with datasets but also the ability to account for, intervene around and participate in the wider (...) socio-technical infrastructures through which data is created, stored and analysed – which we call “data infrastructure literacy”. We illustrate this notion with examples of “inventive data practice” from previous and ongoing research on open data, online platforms, data journalism and data activism. Drawing on these perspectives, we argue that data literacy initiatives might cultivate sensibilities not only for data science but also for data sociology, data politics as well as wider public engagement with digital data infrastructures. The proposed notion of data infrastructure literacy is intended to make space for collective inquiry, experimentation, imagination and intervention around data in educational programmes and beyond, including how data infrastructures can be challenged, contested, reshaped and repurposed to align with interests and publics other than those originally intended. (shrink)

The framework of plateaus, dips, and leaps shines light on periods when individuals may be inventing new methods of skilled performance. We begin with a review of the role performance plateaus have played in experimental psychology, human–computer interaction, and cognitive science. We then reanalyze two classic studies of individual performance to show plateaus and dips which resulted in performance leaps. For a third study, we show how the statistical methods of Changepoint Analysis plus a few simple heuristics may direct our (...) focus to periods of performance change for individuals. For the researcher, dips become the marker of exploration where performance suffers as new methods are invented and tested. Leaps mark the implementation of a successful new method and an incremental jump above the path plotted by smooth and steady log–log performance increments. The methods developed during these dips and leaps are the key to surpassing one's teachers and acquiring extreme expertise. (shrink)

On the one hand, consciousness seems to be utterly the wrong sort of phenomenon to capture in a scientific theory. On the other hand, theorizing about consciousness does not seem to be beyond the pale of science. This dissertation tries to resolve this dilemma of consciousness for the cognitive sciences by answering the three following questions: What are the appropriate properties of the mind and the brain to study in order to develop a theory of consciousness? What informational role does (...) consciousness play in our psychological life? How does the underlying neurophysiological structure of consciousness relate to higher-level information processing descriptions of consciousness? In discussing these issues, I defend the viability of the project against popular philosophical objections and then develop my own framework for approaching the scientific study of consciousness based on work in neurophysiology, developmental psychology, neurology, cognitive neuropsychology, and cognitive psychology. In particular, this dissertation argues that consciousness is actually a structural property of the brain relative to higher level information processing. ;I argue that qualitative states are aligned with a single and distinct memory system. Understanding how that system works, and how it differs from other systems, should allow us to "decompose" consciousness in a naturalistic framework. Though the operations of our different memory systems are not completely understood, it is clear that our "semantic" memory system can be identified with conscious experience. The study of semantic memory across the various investigative domains within the cognitive sciences bounds the phenomena of consciousness such as to make it amenable to scientific scrutiny. This then gives us a solid interdisciplinary framework in which to begin a thorough study of qualitative experience. (shrink)

Research ethics guidelines grew out of several infamous episodes where research subjects were exploited. There is significant international synchronization of guidelines. However, indigenous groups in New Zealand, Canada and Australia have criticized these guidelines as being inadequate for research involving indigenous people and have developed guidelines from their own cultural perspectives. Whilst traditional research ethics guidelines place a lot of emphasis on informed consent, these indigenous guidelines put much greater emphasis on interdependence and trust. This article argues that traditional guidelines (...) are premised on relationships of equal power, and that often the researcher has more power that is not fully equalized by providing information. Where there is a relationship of unequal power, then focusing on interdependence and trust is more likely to achieve ethical safety. We illustrate this thesis by describing the detail of a research project looking at the use of interpreters, where we video-recorded live consultations and then interviewed the patient, interpreter and doctor. We conclude by suggesting that mainstream research ethics guidelines should pay more attention to the development of a trustworthy relationship between subject and researcher, and that, following the lead from clinical medicine, we should develop a culturally competent ethical framework for research on human subjects. (shrink)

The multiplicity of deubiquitinating enzymes (DUBs) encoded by vertebrate genomes is partly attributable to whole genome duplication events that occurred early in chordate evolution. By surveying the literature for the largest family of DUBs (the ubiquitin-specific proteases), extensive functional redundancy for duplicated genes has been confirmed as opposed to singletons. Dramatically conflicting results have been reported for loss of function studies conducted through RNA interference as opposed to inactivating mutations, but the contradictory findings can be reconciled by a recently proposed (...) compensatory mechanism involving nonsense-mediated RNA degradation. Duplicated genes are often inactivated to become pseudogenes, and it is proposed that such is the fate of the USP15 gene of zebrafish, a commonly used model system. As it is reviewed here, these observations have implications not only for the interpretation of model system phenotypes but also for therapeutic interventions designed to target DUBs. (shrink)

Why games? How could anyone consider action games an experimental paradigm for Cognitive Science? In 1973, as one of three strategies he proposed for advancing Cognitive Science, Allen Newell exhorted us to “accept a single complex task and do all of it.” More specifically, he told us that rather than taking an “experimental psychology as usual approach,” we should “focus on a series of experimental and theoretical studies around a single complex task” so as to demonstrate that our theories of (...) human cognition were powerful enough to explain “a genuine slab of human behavior” with the studies fitting into a detailed theoretical picture. Action games represent the type of experimental paradigm that Newell was advocating and the current state of programming expertise and laboratory equipment, along with the emergence of Big Data and naturally occurring datasets, provide the technologies and data needed to realize his vision. Action games enable us to escape from our field's regrettable focus on novice performance to develop theories that account for the full range of expertise through a twin focus on expertise sampling and longitudinal studies of simple and complex tasks. (shrink)

Is the feminist project to bring about parity for women and men in traditionally male fields doomed? Recent headlines trumpet that "The more gender equality, the fewer women in STEM." The American Enterprise Institute proposes that it is futile to fund efforts to increase women in STEM fields, given that, “as paradoxical and counter-intuitive as it seems, female underrepresentation in STEM may actually be the result of the great advances in female empowerment, progress, and advancement that have taken place in (...) recent decades, and not the result of systemic gender discrimination.” Meanwhile, men's rights activists exalt new findings as evidence that women just naturally don’t prefer science. These bold claims stem from the “Gender Equality Paradox” hypothesis, which is simply this: Some of the countries with the highest gender equity scores on internationally-comparable indices also show the largest average sex differences in prefrences for STEM careers. In other words, in countries with more gender equality, like Norway and Sweden, fewer women choose to enter STEM fields than in countries like Algeria or Turkey. Over the past year, the GenderSci Lab has been engaged in a critical analysis of the “Gender Equality Paradox” hypothesis and its accompanying assumptions and implications. In this paper, we share our reanalysis of some of the data used by Stoet and Geary (2018) and argue that their findings are likely spurious. (shrink)

ArgumentIt would have been easy for a less imaginative historian of mathematics than Herbert Mehrtens to have portrayed the work of Hilbert, Hausdorff, and other modernists as pioneers, and those who did not subscribe to their program as people who failed, were not good enough to make the turn, and were eventually and convincingly left behind. That he did not do so is not only because this would have been a shallow, selective view of the facts: it is incompatible with (...) his Foucauldian approach to the relations between knowledge and power. Instead, he defined what I see as the most intriguing category of actor in his Moderne—Sprache—Mathematik (1990), the Gegenmoderner, or counter-moderns. The three men who characterize this position are Felix Klein, Henri Poincaré, and Luitzen Brouwer, and each merits a section in the book.Of the three, Poincaré is the hardest to contain within that category. The range of his work, the nature of his influence, and the shifting standards by which mathematical significance has been evaluated by mathematicians, historians of mathematics, and society at large, all contribute to the problem. After thirty years, the methodological presumptions and aspirations of historians of mathematics have also changed, and I shall suggest that one way to appreciate the richness of Mehrtens’ book, to gain insight into what is meant by mathematical modernism, and to acknowledge a generation of work by other historians since 1990, is to re-examine aspects of Poincaré’s life and work and scholarship about him. Prodded by remarks by Leo Corry, Moritz Epple, and David Rowe, I shall suggest that the simple but useful dichotomy modern/counter-modern must be seen as a way into a more complicated situation, one in which different aspects of mathematics, specifically applied mathematics and the relationship of mathematics to contemporary physics, require fresh accounts of the role of modern mathematics in society. (shrink)

Most people in the United States agree they want some income inequality but debate exactly how much is fair. High‐status people generally prefer more inequality than low‐status individuals. Here we examine how much preferences for inequality are (or are not) driven by self‐interest. Past work has generally investigated this idea in two ways: The first is by stratifying preferences by income, and the second is by randomly assigning financial status within lab‐constructed scenarios. In this paper, we develop a method that (...) combines both experimental control and the social experience of inequality—a simulated society experiment. Across two experiments (N = 138, observations = 690), participants voted on the distribution of rewards—first behind a veil of ignorance, and then when they were randomly assigned a status within a game of chance. Status varied repeatedly across five rounds, allowing us to measure dynamic preferences. Under the veil of ignorance, people preferred inequality favoring the top status. When the veil of ignorance disappeared, self‐interest immediately influenced inequality preferences. Those who randomly landed in top positions were satisfied with the status quo established under the veil of ignorance, whereas those who randomly landed in bottom positions wanted more equality. Yet these preferences were not stable; decisions about the optimal level of inequality changed according to changes in social status. Our results also showed that, when inequality grows in a society, preferences regarding inequality become polarized by social status. Individuals in low‐status positions, particularly, tend to demand more equality. (shrink)

This essay applies the principle of justice as fairness to the issue of same-sex marriage. I will outline Rawls’s theory of justice, including the original position and the veil of ignorance as the means by which choosers craft a just state. In considering whether same-sex marriage should be permissible, I argue that a just society, formulated in the Rawlsian context of justice as fairness, should allow them. I assert that gays and lesbians do count as equal citizens because they possess (...) the minimum requirements of the capacity for a sense of justice, a conception of the good, and the ability to be cooperating members of society. Furthermore, within the original position gays and lesbians will be represented because choosers do not know their sexual orientation because it is one of the individual characteristics that are withheld behind the veil. Since the choosers do not know their sexual orientation, they will be unable to use that information in their construction of what counts as a just state comprised of free and equal citizens. Because the family, and the institution of marriage as a primary manifestation of the family, is one of the major social institutions within the basic structure, limitations must be carefully scrutinized. (shrink)

(1997). Super‐paradigms, art, and science: Romanticism and the birth of social science. The European Legacy: Vol. 2, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, pp. 749-754.